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The Iranian constitutional movement (1906–1911) occurred at a time when revolution was in the 
air in a number of peripheral nations. In that period of the early twentieth century, a series of up-
risings occurred in the third world countries including the Indian nationalist movement of 1905–
1908 against the British, the Maji Maji uprising in Tanganyika in 1905–1907 against German 
rule, the Bambata (Zulu) Rebellion of 1906 in South Africa against the British, the Young Turks 
Revolution of 1908, the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and the Chinese Revolution of 1911–1912.1 
While the essence of the Indian and African movements was anti-colonial, pro-democracy ideas 
were dominant in the latter three (Ottoman Empire, Mexico and China) alongside the Russian 
(1905), Iranian (1906) and the Portuguese (1910) movements/revolutions.2 A satirical Iranian 
journal (Journal of Despotism) at the time remarkably referred to these democratic movements 
around the world as “siblings”.3
In Iran, the so-called tobacco movement of 1890–1891, which is recognised as a precursor of 
the constitutional movement, did carry a spirit of anti-colonialism. It resulted in the annulment 
of the monarch’s concession to a British citizen regarding production, sales and marketing of 
tobacco in Iran.4 The Iranian constitutional movement of 1906, however, centered on a national 
quest for positivist rule of law – an inclination that was largely due to the intellectual efforts of the 
so-called enlightened thinkers of the late nineteenth-century Iran. This handful of intellectuals was 
influenced by the liberal positivist discourse of nineteenth-century Europe. On the one hand, due 
to the natural appeal of liberal philosophy for those living under tyranny, the pioneers of the con-
stitutional movement in Iran were undoubtedly inspired by the enlightenment principles embodied 
in the United States Declaration of Independence and the [French] Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and of the Citizen. The Resaleye Yek Kalameh (The Book of One Word), written in 1870, is 
* LLM (Harv), PhD (Berne) Lecturer in Law, Te Piringa – Faculty of Law, The University of Waikato. The Author 
wishes to thank Professor Duncan Kennedy of Harvard Law School for his intellectual support and Gay Morgan for 
her useful feedback. All errors remain mine.
1 Janet Afary The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906-1911 (Columbia University Press, New York, 1996) at 37.
2 Charles Kurzman Democracy Denied, 1905-1915: Intellectuals and the Fate of Democracy (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, 2008) at 5.
3 Ibid, at 6.
4 For a brief account of the tobacco movement see Nikki Keddie Roots of Revolution: An Interpretation of History of 
Modern Iran (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1981) at 67. For the role of merchants in the tobacco movement see 
Afary, above n 1, at 29.
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an example in point where the author has made the first theoretical attempt in history to trace the 
principles of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in the Quran.5
Yet, on the other hand, legal positivism was dominant in the consciousness of prominent Ira-
nian intelligentsia. This was not only because of the emergence of this political and legal philoso-
phy throughout the nineteenth century, but also because of what legal positivism had to offer to 
the lawless society of Iran at the time. This claim goes hand in hand with the understandings of 
British positivists in early twentieth century who noted that “positivism” played “so great a part” 
in the democratic movements across the world.6
The paper seeks to trace elements of legal positivism in a chapter of Iranian intellectual history 
during the years preceding the constitutional movement. Mirza Malkum Khan (1833–1908) and 
Talebov (1832–1910) are among the most influential thinkers of the pre-constitutional era who 
have specifically written on modern law concepts and whose ideas reflect the positivist line of 
thinking. While Mirza Malkum Khan is widely acknowledged among historians as a liberal posi-
tivist, Talebov is depicted as a rather socially oriented intellectual.7 Without denying other strands 
of thought, including Marxism in Talebov’s writings, this paper contests this view by highlight-
ing his classical positivist writings. In demonstrating this point, the principle methodology used 
throughout this paper is to present traces of legal positivist ideas primarily through translations 
of block quotes selected from both authors’ own writings. Commentaries of prominent Iranian 
historians have also been drawn upon to provide context. Most of the translations provided in this 
paper are presented for the first time. In particular, in the case of Talebov, some of the translated 
texts provided in this paper have remained unexplored even in the Farsi literature.
ii. Mirza MalkuM khan: a hard-corE lEgal Positivist
Mirza Malkum Khan (Malkum)8 is cited as the most influential figure among his peers in Iran’s 
pre-constitutional era.9 His personal character and his political career are both clouded with enor-
mous controversy, attracting admiration as well as hostile accounts. There is no doubt, however, 
that his ideas, including most notably the quest for the rule of law, form an indispensable part of 
modern Iranian legal thought. Malkum’s thoughts had a significant influence on the legal con-
sciousness of the Iranian early constitutionalists.
5 See Mirza Yousef Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh Yek Kalameh (the Book of One Word) (first pub. 1870), in Mohammad 
Sadeq Feiz (ed) (Sabah, Tehran, 2003). 
6 Kurzman, above n 2, at 6.
7 Fereydoon Adamiyat Fekre Azadi va Moqadameye Nehzate Mashrootiyat (The Idea of Liberty and the Interlude of 
the Constitutional Movement) (Sokhan, Tehran, 1961) at 98.
8 For a short biography see Farzin Vahdat God and Juggernaut: Iran’s Intellectual Encounter with Modernity (Syra-
cuse University Press, New York, 2002) at 30, 94–98.
9 Fereydoon Adamiyat Ideologiye Nehzate Mashrootiyat (The Ideology of Constitutional Movement) ( Roshangaran, 
Tehran, 1971); Fereydoon Adamiyat Andishehaye Miraza Aqa Khan Kermani (The Thoughts of Mirza Agha Khan 
Kermani) (Payam, Tehran, 1978); Hasan Ghazi-Moradi Nazariyeh Pardaze Nosaziye Siyayi dar Sadre Mashrooteh 
(The Theoretician of Political Modernization in Early Era of the Constitutional Revolution) (Tehran, 2008); Hamid 
Algar Mirza Malkum Khan; A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism (University of California Press, Berke-
ley, 1973); Homa Nategh Ma va Mirza Malkum Khanhaye Ma (We and our Mirza Malkum Khan) (Tehran, 1975); 
Mashallah Ajoudani Mashrouteye Irani va pishzaminehay nazariye-ye Velayate Faqih (Iranian Constitutional Mon-
archy and the Backgrounds for the Theory of the Guardianship of Islamic Jurists) (Fasle Ketab, London, 1997); 
Abdol-hari Haeri Tashayo’ va Mashroutiyat Dar Iran (Shi’ism and Constitutional Monarchy in Iran) (Amir Kabir, 
Tehran, 1981).
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Mirza Malkhum Khan Nazem al-Dowleh (1833–1908) was born into an Armenian family in 
Esfahan. He was sent to Paris to study engineering where he developed an interest in the works of 
Saint-Simon and Comte. He converted to Islam upon his arrival and created a campaign (through 
a secret association based on the Freemasonry model called Faramoush-Khane (oblivion houses)) 
to persuade Naser al-Din Shah to initiate modernisation reforms, mainly based on the Ottoman 
model of Tanzimat (re-organisation). The Shah eventually became suspicious of his activities and 
exiled him to Baghdad, and from there to Istanbul. Through mediation of Shah’s ambassador 
to Istanbul (Moshir ad-Dowleh), the young Malkum returned to Iran. After a period of ups and 
downs in his political career, and as a result of his friendship with Moshir ad-Dowleh who had 
became Iran’s chancellor, in around 1873 Malkum was sent to London as Iran’s ambassador. 
At the outset, Malkum was commended due to his success and was even awarded a royal title 
(prince). Later, however, after the Shah failed to live up to his promises made during his London 
visit, to grant Malkum certain trade concessions, they fell apart. Malkum was discharged from 
all his duties and put on trial. After being humiliated, he rebelled against Naser al-Din Shah and 
moved ahead with the publication of his influential London-based newspaper “the Qanun” (law) 
in the 1890s. The Qanun was published between 1890 (coinciding with the Iranian anti-colonial 
tobacco movement) and 1898 (eight years before the constitutional revolution). There was little 
doubt that it had a significant role in Iran’s awakening and the nation’s quest for the rule of law. 
After the assassination of Naser ad-Din Shah and the coronation of his successor Mozafar ad-Din 
Shah, Malkum was again appointed as ambassador, this time in Rome, a position he held for ten 
years. He passed away in Switzerland in 1908, at the age of 77, and his body was cremated as he 
had requested.
In terms of political philosophy, it is hardly contested that Malkum was a vehement positivist. 
In particular, Auguste Comte, whose books he read while he was in Paris, had a great influence 
on Malkum’s thinking.10 Later, in London, as Iran’s ambassador, he became fascinated by John 
Stewart Mill and translated parts of On Liberty11 into Persian. Malkum was also a staunch believer 
in liberal economics. Key to his reform ideas was full respect for individual property, private en-
trepreneurship and free trade. In the same vein, in Malkum’s writings the role of a government in 
the economy is restricted to the provision of security and infrastructure so that private investment 
could be attracted and flourish.12 As will be seen, Malkum’s thinking goes hand in hand with JS 
Mill’s political philosophy discourse. Malkum notes:13
Almost every branch of science has left a trace in Iran except for political economy that is a modern sci-
ence and is completely ignored here…
Also that:14
Political economy is the most inclusive field of science and if its principles were to be adopted in Iran, tax 
income would increase to twenty million [units of currency] in less than two years with no subjugation or 
violation of Sharia.
10 Adamiyat, above n 7, at 98.
11 John Stuart Mill On Liberty (Longman, Roberts and Green, London, 1859).
12 Fereshteh Nourani Malkhum Khan Nazem al-Doleh (Jiibee, Tehran, 1973) at 82. 
13 Malkum’s letter to the Foreign Ministry in Adamiyat, above n 7, at 114 (Idiomatic translation).
14 Hojatollah Asil Resalehay Mirza Malkum Khan Nazem al-Dowleh (The Essays of Mirza Malkum Khan Nazem al-
Dowle) (Nei, Tehran, 2002).
2011 Legal Positivism in the Pre-Constitutional Era of Late Nineteenth-Century Iran 177
One difficulty with putting Malkum in a box is that he frequently adjusted his approach to po-
litical circumstances for over more than fifty years of his active life. Ghazi-Moradi explains how 
Malkum oscillated between advocating top-down and bottom-up policy approaches in accordance 
with his relationship with in Iran’s political apparatus.15 Others have explained his change of ap-
proach to be driven solely by his personal interests.16 It seems however, as a politician, so long as 
he was part of the government apparatus, he strived to influence the Shah’s mind through propos-
ing top-down reforms. He wrote Daftar-e-Tanzimat (On Re-organisation) in 1860 to encourage 
Naser ad-Din Shah to adopt such reforms. When he fell out of favour completely with Naser 
ad-Din Shah, he took an opposite approach by publishing the Qanun, advocating his ideas at the 
grass roots level and criticising (though mostly indirectly) the Shah’s governance. After Naser 
ad-Din Shah’s assassination and Mozafar ad-Din Shah’s coronation, Malkum returned to politics 
and hence top-down reform became appealing once again. During this period, Malkum wrote 
Nedaye-Edalat (Voice of Justice) for the newly-crowned Shah after he took his new position as an 
ambassador to Rome.
A. “Government According to Law”
There is little doubt that Malkum was a firm believer in a Westernisation project throughout his 
career. The foundations of Malkum’s ideas on government are laid out in Daftar-e-Tanzimat (On 
Re-organisation), Majlis-e-Tanzimat (The Assembly of Re-organisation); and Daftar-e-Qanun 
(the Book of Law).17 All three books, which were written in the period approximately between 
1860–1862, fully represent Malkum’s legal reform ideas in the pre-Qanun era. In these books, 
Malkum openly describes his project as “the adoption of Western civilization absent any Iranian 
intervention” by which he intends “a total submission to European civilization”18 in all aspects of 
life in a complete one-size-fits-all fashion. The foundation of Malkum’s Westernisation project 
emanates from his belief that the dissemination of Western civilisation across the world would 
not only be inevitable, but also desirable for the prosperity and evolution of human collectivity.19 
On the basis of that idea, Malkum viewed Iran’s transformation as inevitable and the adoption of 
Western civilization as imperative:20
Iran’s ministers assume that three thousand years of Iranian history would [simply] avert all trouble. Eu-
ropean sciences are flooding the nations around the world and the more we give way to them, the better 
we can benefit from them.
Earlier in his career, the younger Malkum seemed to believe that the basic principles of European 
organisations could be borrowed in the same fashion that technology, such as the telegraph, first 
entered Tehran. He analogised any struggle to reinvent European principles of governance to an 
empty effort of reinventing the telegraph.21 His explanation for such propositions is worth quot-
ing: 22
15 Ghazi-Moradi, above n 9.
16 Nategh, above n 9; Algar, above n 9.
17 Asil, above n 14.
18 Adamiyat, above n 7, at 114.
19 Ibid.
20 Malkum Resaleye Dastgahe Divan (The Essay on the Bureaucratic State) in Asil, above n 14.
21 Malkum Daftar-e-Tanzimat in Asil, above n 14, at 30. 
22 Malkum Resaleye Dastgahe Divan (The Essay on Bureaucratic State) Translated by Vahdat, above n 8, at 32. 
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The government of Iran, in facing the encroachment of European hegemony, is no different from the 
Ottoman government… The point is that the surge of the European power has made the survival of bar-
barian governments impossible. From now on, all governments on earth must be organized in the same 
fashion as European governments, or they will be conquered and subjugated by them.
Malkum could also be considered as the founder of the idea of the establishment of the modern 
rule of law in Iran. It is striking that rule of law concerns loom larger in Malkum’s mind than his 
Westernisation project throughout his career. In Daftar-e- Tanzimat where he elaborates on the 
notion of government, lawmaking and law enforcement, Malkum divides governments into two: 
republic and monarchy, the latter being subdivided into absolute and moderate monarchy. Mod-
erate monarchy, in Malkum’s terminology, mainly refers to the British and the French systems 
of governance at the time. He does not, however, see the system of moderate monarchy “where 
people are the lawmakers and the kings are the executor of the law” as suitable for Iran. Rather, he 
follows the Ottoman model of Majles Tanzimat (Re-organization Assembly. His own words are 
unequivocal, “the law should reflect the emperor’s will and guarantee the public interest”.23
Despites Malkum’s advocacy for absolute monarchy, due to pragmatic concerns, he strived to 
uphold a notion of “government according to law” as opposed to “government according to the 
will of the sovereign”. This is well reflected in the Daftar-e-Qanun where he defines the law as 
“any decision, which is issued in accordance with a specific arrangement by the legal apparatus”.24 
He goes on to distinguish monarchic decrees, which may have been all well and good, but could 
not be called the “law” of the land – the law must necessarily be an outcome of a legal apparatus. 
Malkum does not seem to be concerned with the notion of representative democracy, or the issue 
of legitimacy of the government in any form, in any of his writings before the (1890–1899) period.
It was only after 1890 that Malkum, in one issue after another, gradually departed from the 
idea of absolute monarchy to the one of constitutional monarchy. The establishment of the Qanun 
in London was basically a result of Malkum’s reaction to his dismissal from all his governmental 
duties after the dispute over the cancellation of his lottery concessions. Malkum, in grounding 
the Qanun (especially from the fourth issue onward) on the notion of “human conduct” is clearly 
influenced by Auguste Comte’s Religion of Humanity.
Ghazi-Moradi presents a chronologicalnarrative of the development of Malkum’s agenda dur-
ing the eight years of the Qanun. To restructure Ghazi-Moradi’s construction briefly, in the first 
issue of the Qanun, Malkum presents a more balanced definition of law: “law consists of the 
solicitation of the power of a group of people in order to secure the rights of the public”.25 The 
obscure language used above seems to be akin to JS Mills’ idea of disproportionate democracy, 
in which educated and more responsible persons would be made more influential by giving them 
more votes than the uneducated.26 In the same issue Malkum reiterates his rule of law ideas pay-
ing, however, tribute to Sharia:27
Our claim is not to adopt Parisian, Russian or Indian laws. The principles of all the good laws are every-
where the same, the best of which are laid out in Allah’s Sharia. Nonetheless, due to the lack of enforce-
ment of these laws we have suffered too much and we desire the rule of law to the extent that we could 
23 Malkum Resaleye Dastgahe Divan Translated by Vahdat, above n 8, at 36.
24 Daftar-e-Qanun in Asil, above n 14.
25 Qanun, No 1 in Homa Nategh Rooznameye Qanune Mirza Malkum Khan (Amir Kabir, Tehran, 1976).
26 John Stuart Mill Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002, revised 2007), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/mill/>. 
27 Qanun, No 1, above n 25.
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settle on any law even if it comes from Turkmenistan. That is because the most mundane laws are better 
than lawlessness.
In the third issue he still “encourages” the Shah to look up to the Russian Tsar: 28
The utmost power is vested in the Russian Tsar. Yet, he is not able to mete out punishment on anyone 
without the order of the [judicial] bureaucracy. No one has placed any limitations on the Tsar’s power. 
The Tsar himself owing to his education and enlightened knowledge has willingly made the enactment 
of laws and observations thereof, the basis of his splendor. The Tsar has made himself, more than anyone 
else, obedient to the law because obeying the law has given him dominance over twenty “lawless” kings.
He criticises the “inefficiency” of the existing Majlis-e-Shora-e-Melli (Consultative Assembly) – 
a Qajar institution – and introduces, for the first time, the idea of a “National Consultative Assem-
bly”. Such a national assembly would consist of a minimum of 100 eminent Mojtaheds (Islamic 
jurists) as well as well-known scholars and prominent intellectuals.
In the twelfth issue, Malkum finally denounces despotism. In the twenty-third issue, he even 
adopts a revolutionary tone:29
The world history has shown us that the awakening of governments has to begin with the awakening 
of nations. We have thus far struggled to make our voice heard to the government officials. Enough is 
enough! This is the time to bring our complaints to our own nation. [Idiomatic translation]
In the twenty fourth issue, Malkum elaborates on the three separated branches of government for 
the first time. He then notes that “the root cause of all our problems … is that in our country, there 
has been no trace of the third condition of the [rule of] law, i.e. ensuring the enforcement of the 
law.”30
The Qanun was widely circulated across Iran through secret associations called Majma-e-Ad-
amiyat (Humanity Leagues) whose articles of association and structural organisation were written 
by Malkum himself. These Leagues were institutionally modelled after European masonry lodges 
although the existence of any real connection between them and the European freemasonry is 
contested. The issue 25 of the Qanun is presented as a translation of a classified report of a for-
eign country’s ambassador regarding these associations. In this story, which may or may not be 
fabricated, the ambassador is astonished at these associations in Iranian society. The Ambassador 
notes that Iranian Humanity Leagues “have grounded the totality of the world’s advancement on 
Islamic principles … instead of emulating the Europeans, they seek to extract all the principles 
of progress from Islam itself.”31After elaborating on the complex organisational structure of the 
Leagues throughout the country, this Ambassador coins the idea of bicameral legislative bodies 
(one elected by the people and the second consisting of the elite) from the perspective of the Hu-
manity Leagues. This is the first time that Malkum pursued a version of popular sovereignty in his 
vision for an Iranian parliamentary system.
After Naser al-Din Shah’s assassination and upon the coronation of his more open-minded 
successor, Mozafar ad-Din Shah, Malkum restored confidence in a top-down reform.32 In this 
late period of his political career, he dedicated a book titled Nedaye-Edalat (Voice of Justice) to 
the new Shah and later became ambassador to Rome. While Malkum remained faithful to legal 
positivism until the end of his career, he started to emphasise the importance of “rights”. In his 
28 Malkum Resaleye Dastgahe Divan Translated by Vahdat, above n 8, at 33, modified by author. 
29 Qanun No 23, above n 25. 
30 Qanun No 24, above n 25.
31 Qanun No 25, above n 25.
32 Ghazi-Moradi, above n 9, at 183.
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book, Serat al-Mostaghim (The Straight Path), Malkum maintains that individual rights are based 
on four pillars: security (including financial and personal security); [free] will or liberty (including 
personal freedom, freedom of expression, etc.); equality (including equality before law); and mer-
it-based status, where knowledge should be the sole criterion for government recruitment.33 On 
the limits of personal freedom, he reiterates that “there are no rights and duties in the world with-
out delimitations and the limit of freedom is that no one should encroach on any one’s rights.”34 
Yet, Malkum does not hesitate to suggest that the rule of law is as important (and perhaps more 
important) than the content of the law, as he reiterates:35
Law consists of words without souls. If we adopt the most perfect laws existing in the world but fail to 
enforce them for a hundred years to come, there is no benefit to having such laws.
He also proposes the basic rule of law principle of no punishment without law.36
B. On Classical Economics
Legal ideas are understood to have a dynamic, dialectical or constitutive relationship to economic 
activity.37 In this vein, liberal economics may be seen as a corollary of legal positivism as a subset 
of nineteenth-century classical legal thought.38 In this section, Malkum’s positivism is contrasted 
with his economic views to demonstrate his intellectual consistency. Malkum’s essay, Osoule 
Taraqi (The Principles of Progress),39 appears to be the first treatise (a 40-page booklet) written 
in Farsi on basic economic theory. Written in approximately 1883, the booklet is probably Mal-
kum’s most scholarly writing absent the use of academic language. In The Principles of Progress, 
Malkum presents real-life examples of basic economic concepts in a way understandable to the 
nineteenth-century Iranian elite. He stresses the notion of wealth maximisation as a fundamental 
means to European progress. The booklet includes a series of legal and economic policy rec-
ommendations for Iran’s development, including monetary policy, banking and finance (he pro-
posed the establishment of a national bank), providing concessions to foreign companies to attract 
investment, public education as a means of economic growth, securing individual and property 
rights, setting up a modern police force, upholding the rule of law as a means of economic devel-
opment, government investment in infrastructure, enhancing the competitiveness of the Iranian 
economy, abolishing internal customs duties, and the full scale liberalisation of trade and the fi-
nancial market.40 Malkum also envisages the principles of taxation, the law of provincial regula-
tory assemblies and ways to reduce poverty by building transportation infrastructure by which to 
enhance commodity exports.41
Malkum further stresses market competition as a means to push prices down. In an analysis 
of factors of production, he notes that Iranian economy, being rich in land and labour, suffers 
33 Malkum Serat al-Mostaghim (The Straight Path) in Asil, above n 14.
34 Malkum Nedaye Edalat (The Voice of Justice) in Asil, above n 14.
35 See Malkum Divan Khane (The Law of Judicial Institutions) in Asil, above n 14.
36 Ibid. 
37 Duncan Kennedy “Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000” in The New Law and Economic 
Development David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds) (Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006) at 19.
38 Ibid.
39 Osoule Taraqi (The Principles of Progress) in Asil, above n 14. 
40 Ibid, at 195. 
41 Adamiyat, above n 7, at 144.
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mainly from a shortage of capital, the analogy being blood for economic veins. Malkum was not 
an economist by education and should not be expected to have expounded on such concepts as 
Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”42 or David Ricardo’s “free trade”. He repeatedly suggests that 
these could only be studied at schools. In segments of the booklet however, he attempts to explain 
an overly simplified version of Ricardo’s comparative advantage theory.43 On free trade, Malkum 
follows Ricardo’s footsteps when he postulates a direct relationship between trade openness and 
wealth maximisation. He thinks that the problem with Iranian people is that they do not under-
stand that trade is not a zero-sum game.44 He notes: 45
In order for Iran’s development with respect to its trade relationships [with the world] to become parallel 
with and to have a share in the world’s prosperity, it is imperative to open all the ports and rivers. There 
should be no fear from foreign trade. All foreigners should be issued permits and encouraged to bring 
their money in and out of the country to the maximum extent possible.
Malkum further contends that the Asian elite do not comprehend the objective of European’s 
colonialism which is solely to gain trade benefits. He reiterates that the British Treasury does 
not receive a penny from the Indians in the form of taxes.46 A few pages later, he completes his 
views on colonialism by making a distinction between Western occupations for trade purpos-
es (e.g. British occupation of Bangladesh) and those for political reasons (British occupation of 
Afghanistan).47Although Malkum’s pro-colonialism may also be motivated by personal interest,48 
one should also note that it was simply beyond classical economics, let alone his own knowledge 
and expertise, to fully grasp the ramifications of such blunt advocacy for full liberalisation. Even a 
century after Malkum’s death, when the pitfalls of hasty trade liberalisation for third-world econo-
mies were acknowledged in economics theories such as declining terms of trade for primary prod-
ucts – known as Prebisch-Singer theory – neoliberal economics of the 1980s and 1990s, reflected 
in the so-called Washington Consensus, drew heavily on classical theories of the nineteenth cen-
tury.49 In sum, Malkum Khan is the first Iranian who raised fundamental questions of modern 
economics and proposed a comprehensive economic development reform plan. In a letter to the 
foreign ministry where he laid out a detailed development plan similar to that described above, 
Naser ad-Din Shah’s dismissive words read: “These are not comprehendible [here] in Iran”.
iii. gEnEalogy of talEBov’s lEgal thought
Talebov’s role in the formation of modern Iranian legal thought can hardly be overstated. His 
positivist legal writings, however, have remained unexplored in the literature on Iranian consti-
tutional revolution. Adamiyat, a pre-eminent Iranian historian, stresses Talebov’s natural law and 
42 Adam Smith The Wealth of Nations (W Strahan and T Cadell, London, 1776).
43 David Ricardo On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation (John Murray, London, 1817).
44 Malkum Osoule Taraqi (The Principles of Progress; idiomatic translation) in Asil, above n 14, at 191.
45 Ibid, at 191.
46 Ibid, at 189. 
47 Ibid, at 199. 
48 Cf Javad Tabatabaei Nazariye-e-Hokoumat-e-Qanun-dar Iran (A Theory of the Rule of Law in Iran) (Sotoudeh, Teh-
ran, 2008).
49 For more on the history of development economics see James M Cypher, James L Dietz The Process of Economic 
Development (Rutledge, New York, 2009).
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socialist orientation and downplays traces of legal positivism in his thinking.50 Indeed, Talebov 
was the first Iranian who advocated a systemic plan for dismantling the semi-feudal structure of 
Iran.51 Yet, without denying other strands of thought in Talebov’s writings, including socialism,52 
the thesis here is that nineteenth-century legal positivism was dominant in Talebov’s conscious-
ness. For instance, Talebov believed that an owner’s “will” is essential for dispensing with prop-
erty rights unless it clashes with the right of government to build a railroad or a tunnel through that 
property, in which case the owner is only entitled to compensation.53 Talebov’s classical view on 
“the will theory”54 clearly sets him apart from outright Marxism.55 A number of examples in sup-
port of this line of argument will be provided below.
Abd al-Rahim Talebov (1832–1910) was born into a middle-class family of artisans in Ta-
briz located in northwest Iran.56 At the age of sixteen he left Iran for Tbilisi to study in modern 
schools of the Caucasus where he later became a successful businessman.57 According to Afshar, 
Russian was the only foreign language Talebov knew,58 through which he had access to French 
and English literature.59 The philosophers whose ideas Talebov cites include Bentham, Voltaire, 
Rousseau, Renan, Kant and Nietzsche.60 Talebov wrote his 11 books after the age of 55,61 all of 
which had a direct impact on Iran’s constitutional movement.62 Talebov’s books demonstrate his 
fascination with science as he dealt with basics of physics, chemistry and biology. He drew inter-
esting analogies between molecular physics, spheres of liberty and rights in law. This, according 
to Roscoe Pound, is typical among the positivists of the nineteenth century whose books were full 
of analogies between science and law as an indication of their scientific approach to law.63 The 
second generation of positivists was particularly influenced by Darwinian evolutionary thought.64 
Talebov was also a firm believer in the evolutionary theories of biology from which he also drew 
analogies to explain “the struggle for existence”, following in Hobbes’ footsteps, as a natural ba-
sis, for wars throughout history.65 He also promoted the idea of social Darwinism in his writings.66
50 Fereydoon Adamiyat Andishaye Talebuf Tabrizi (The Thoughts of Talebuf Tabrizi) (Payam, Tehran, 1976) at 32. For 
argument in favour of Talebov’s positivism see Vahdat, above n 8, at 48–54. 
51 Vahdat, above n 8, at 32. 
52 Adamiyat traces Marxism in Talebov’s writings; see Homa Nategh “Ostadam Fereydoone Adamiyat” <www.homa-
nategh.net/uploads/2/3/2/8/2328777/ostadam.pdf>. 
53 Adamiyat, above n 50, at 37. 
54 Duncan Kennedy From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s ‘Consideration and Fo-
rum’ (2000) 100 Colum L Rev 94, 106–108, 115–116.
55 For “the will theory” as a flagship idea of nineteenth century classical legal thought see Kennedy, above n 38, at 
25–26.
56 Ibid, at 1. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Iraj Afshar Abd al-Rahim Talihuf Tabrizi: Azadi va Siasat (Liberty and Politics) (Sahar, Tehran, 1978) at 14. 
59 Adamiyat, above n 50, at 3. 
60 Adamiyat, above n 50, at 8.
61 Ibid, at 3. Also see Afshar, above n 58, at 14.
62 Vahdat, above n 8, at 48.
63 Roscoe Pound The End of Law as Developed in Juristic Thought (1917) 30 Harv L Rev 222. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Talebov Masael al-Hayat (The Questions of Life) (Jibi, Tehran, 1967) at 56–61. Adamiyat criticises his Hobbesian 
views; see Adamiyat, above n 50, at 20.
66 Adamiyat, above n 50.
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One of Talebov’s most interesting books, Ketab-e-Ahmad (The Book of Ahmad) comes in 
three volumes. It is written in the style of a novel – clearly modelled on Rousseau’s Emile67 – to 
communicate with a wider range of readership. Malkum praises Talebov’s accessible language by 
citing an Iranian poem: “In dealing with kids, speak children’s language”.68
A. ‘Liberty’ and “Rights”
Talebov, on different occasions, straightforwardly defined freedom as a “natural right”, which 
could not be impeded or diminished otherwise. In The Path of the Blessed, Telebov makes a ref-
erence to Ernest Renan, his contemporary French philosopher, stating that humanity is based n a 
“natural” system of “equality, fraternity and liberty”.69 Talebov conceptualises freedom in abso-
lute terms:70
The words Huriyat in Arabic, Azadi in Persian, or Uzdenlek in Turkish [liberty], constitute a “natural” 
freedom; [that is] human beings, by nature, are born free and have autonomy over all their words and 
deeds. Except for their commander, that is their [own] “will”, there shall be no impediments in their 
deeds and words. God has not created any force external to man to impede him and no one has the power 
to manipulate our liberty, let alone give it or take it away from us.71
Yet, Talebov approaches the question of liberty through the lens of “delimiting spheres of per-
sonal inviolability” in much the same way as the father of utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham did. For 
Bentham the law “provides the basic framework of social interaction by delimiting spheres of per-
sonal inviolability within which individuals can form and pursue their own conceptions of well-
being”.72 The notion of power absolute within a sphere is a flagship idea of nineteenth-century 
European legal thought.73 For instance, Spencer advances the idea of “the function of law in main-
taining the limits within which the freedom of each is to find the widest possible development”.74 
Similarly, Friedrich Carl von Savigny, the father of the Historical School, opines: “If free beings 
are to co-exist … invisible boundaries must be recognized within which the existence and activity 
of each individual gains a secure free opportunity”.75 In this vein, Talebov constantly attempts to 
delineate spheres within which individuals have absolute freedom. He notes:76
In the same way molecules, on the one hand, have absolute freedom (with no restriction and qualifica-
tion) and on the other hand their freedom is nonetheless limited to the laws of connectivity, man’s free-
dom is subject to Sharia and custom.
67 Jean-Jacques Rousseau Emile, or, On Education translated by Allan Bloom (Basic Books, New York, 1979). For 
analogy between the two see Adamiyat, above n 50. See also Vahdat, above n 8, at 48. 
68 Cited in Ghazi-Moradi, above n 9, at 180. 
69 Talebov Masael al-Mohsenin (The Path of the Blessed) (Jibi, Tehran, 1968) at 140–141.
70 Talebov Izahat Dar Khosouse Azadi (Reflections on Liberty) in Afshar, above n 58, at 88.
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72 Paul Kelly Utilitarianism and Distributive Justice: Jeremy Bentham and the Civil Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1990). 
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74 Herbert Spencer First Principles (D Appleton and Company, New York, 1898) at 223.
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Further, in his division of freedom into the three categories of freedom of self, belief and expres-
sion, Talebov consistently takes a similar approach:77
Freedom of self implies that no one can unlawfully imprison anyone or enter his property. Moreover, 
everyone is free as regards their conduct for which no one shall hold them liable unless such acts result in 
someone’s harm or loss [of property].
In a similar vein, Talebov cites defamation as a legitimate example of a limit to freedom of ex-
pression. The freedom of belief, in Talebov’s view, could be restricted only if it led to anarchy or 
disturbed the peace among the people without clarifying what that might imply.78 On the basis of 
the above, Talebov defines the law in natural law terms as follows: 79
[A] systemic articulation of civil and political rights and restrictions [responsibilities] governing the af-
fairs of individuals and society [as a whole], through which every person would be secure in property and 
life and equitably responsible for wrong acts.
Yet, in another essay he endorses the views of “those recent scholars” who opined that rights 
could only be considered law “if they are sanctioned by government force”.80 The following quote 
where Telbov cites and expounds the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham is most revealing:81
Bentham, an acclaimed philosopher, opines that humanity is by nature controlled by two prevailing pow-
ers: pleasure and pain. It is only under these two [qualities] that we could know what should be done, 
since good and evil or cause and deeds [effect] are undoubtedly determined by these two faculties.
After laying out this introduction, the [primary] conclusion we reach is that wherever there is no law, 
there is no principle of utility; and where there is no principle of utility, there is no civilisation; lack of 
civilisation brings fear; and wherever there is fear there is no prosperity. Hence the lack of law equals the 
lack of prosperity.
B. Talebov on Constitutional Law
In Masael al-Hayat (The Questions of Life: the second volume of the Ketabe – Ahmad), Tale-
bov draws comparisons among various constitutional architectures of the world. He finds that 
all constitutional monarchies are in principle founded on a system of a “delimitation of rights”. 82 
His particular interest in the Constitution of the Empire of Japan of 1890 (“Meiji Constitution”) 
is such that he annexes a full Persian translation of that constitution at the end of his book. He 
notes:83
If we provide a brief on each of the [above-mentioned] constitutional laws, the reader will note that they 
are all similar despite difference in details. [Those differences however,] do not negate the main principle 
of constitutionality of the government with the exception of the Japanese constitutional law, … in which 
some crucial rights are declared as prerogatives of the emperor of Japan.
He goes on to justify the Japanese system based on the fact that it is “related to the people and 
circumstances of Japan”.84 By doing so, he indirectly encourages the Iranian monarch to embrace 
77 Talebov, above n 70, at 97. 
78 Ibid.
79 Talebov, above n 70, at 94. Vahdat’s translation revised (see above n 8).
80 Ibid, at 85. 
81 Talebov Ketabe Ahmad (The Book of Ahmad) (Jibi, Tehran, 1967) at 126, 127. 
82 Talebov, above n 70, at 102.
83 Ibid. 
84 Talebov, above n 70, at 102.
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constitutional governance by pointing out that “if the kings of other Asian countries [including 
Iran] take an initiative and follow the footsteps of Japan’s Mikado, they shall also be granted cer-
tain prerogatives”.85 Hence Talebov, similarly to Malkum, seems to have held a pragmatic view 
that the Western constitutional models would not be fit for Iran’s context. The only difference 
between the two is that Talebov defends the Japanese constitution of 1889 (Meiji Constitution) 
while Malkum (before the Qanun era) recommended that the Shah look up to the Russian Tsar.
Yet Talebov’s full resentment of absolute monarchy is well reflected in the Book of Ahmad as 
well as his other books. Furthermore, Talebov is unequivocal in flagging the British constitutional 
system as the most advanced among other systems in ways which resemble Dicey, his contempo-
rary English scholar.86 He further notes:87
In other nations, liberty and the rule of law is a matter of legislation and is maintained through their con-
stitution. In Britain however, constitutional law is being emerged and established out of people’s respect 
for the law throughout history. It is part of the inner nature of each and every single English citizen.
C. Talebov on International Law: A Pure Reflection of Classical Legal Consciousness
Despite Talebov’s criticism of the West’s self-perceived mission of “civilizing” other nations, 
Talebov’s approach to sovereignty and international law remains consistent with his positivist line 
of thought: 88
We explained in defining law that only those ones who appreciate the necessity of preserving the [rule 
of] law would benefit from its virtues. Otherwise it is generally accepted that anybody can appropriate 
an ownerless property … Throughout the Asian history, the sons of the kings killed their fathers; broth-
ers killed brothers [to gain power]. [Then] how can one expect foreigners (or powerful foreign States in 
present times) not to encroach upon other countries’ rights or occupy their land [in such circumstances] 
where the owners of such land are not aware of their right [let alone] deem necessary to preserve it.
He continues:89
A high-ranking British official has said in a speech that Morocco should be controlled by an organized 
government so that commercial interests of the civilized nations could be preserved. A German statesman 
has [also] said that the European states shall not respect the independence of lawless nations. Because 
where there is no law governing a land, it is an ownerless property and whoever possesses it and deter-
mines the rights and responsibilities of the residents therein would be its sharii [lawful] owner.
Talebov uses the term “Sharii” (according to Sharia) with respect to ownerless property by which 
he implies that even Sharia endorses this basic property rule of ownerless lands. Talebov’s anal-
ogy between Sharia property law and international law is striking since international law of Gro-
tius’ times has roots in the private property rights of Roman law.90 More importantly, Talebov’s 
view on sovereignty and international law is significant since it is a mirror reflection of interna-
tional law theories of his time:91
85 Ibid.
86 AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8th ed, Macmillan, London, 1885, 1915). 
87 Talebov, above n 65.
88 Talebov, above n 65.
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90 Anthony Carty The Decay of International Law: A Reappraisal of the Limits of Legal Imagination in International 
Affairs (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986) at 4.
91 Talebov, above n 65. 
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A French scholar opined that law making and its enforcement is to ensure the world order and the endur-
ance of humanity. [In that sense] it is imperative [according to this scholar] for the wise people to occupy 
lawless lands. We reiterate the fact that a right only exists if it is conducive to prosperity and if the right 
holder appreciates it and consciously strives to maintain it. Otherwise there remains neither a right nor a 
right holder.
The doctrine of terra nullius, or the so-called empty land, that is so unmistakably noted by 
Talebov, was expounded by positivist international lawyers such as Wheaton,92 Westlake93 and 
Oppenheim,94 among others. According to this doctrine, non-European states exercised no rights 
under international law over their own territory.95 As Anghie suggests, the idea of the universality 
of international law applied in the naturalist discourse of sixteenth and seventeenth centuries gave 
way to positivist international law that distinguished between civilised states and non-civilised 
states.96 Positivist international law of the nineteenth century developed an entire doctrine to jus-
tify the acquisition of territory by colonial powers.97 It asserted that international law applied only 
to the “sovereign states” that composed the civilised “Family of Nations”.98 Oppenheim, for in-
stance, after pointing out that the law of nations was a product of Christian civilisation, suggests 
that despite the disappearance of perpetual enmity among groups of nations, especially among 
the Christian, Mohammedan and Buddhist states, in the nineteenth century, there is still a broad 
and deep gulf between Christian civilisation and others.99 As a first condition for non-Christian 
nations to become part of the Family of Nations, Oppenheim opines that they should become 
“civilised”.100 This distinction between civilised and uncivilised nations as an element of sover-
eignty is fully reflected in Talebov’s views.
Talebov’s knowledge about international law theories of his time puts him in an uncomfort-
able position — on the one hand, by praising international law as the field of law where “rights 
are used in their real sense”, and on the other hand by reiterating the doctrine of conquest, which 
at the time was openly used by Europeans as a basis for obtaining colonial title.101 Talebov’s pro-
vocative views should also be seen in light of his extreme frustration with the sheer ignorance of 
Iranian officials who were “living in their fantasies bragging about the Russians and the British 
having no right” to interfere in Iran’s affair.102 Talebov complains that Iranian rulers “have no idea 
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that Russia and the Great Britain do not perceive Iran as sovereign. They are struggling over their 
own rights [vis-à-vis our country]”.103
Yet, Talebov is not naïve to the political implications of the nineteenth-century positivist theo-
ries of international law. He believes that Europeans are well aware of the ramifications of such 
theories too. He thinks they understand that there may come a day when the three hundred million 
Muslims from Istanbul to central Asia unite and rise against them to reclaim their rights:104
Thereafter [the Quran’s promise of] “everything will return to its origin” will transform the law of the 
conquest to the law of Islam and humanity. The respectful readership may think of me as a Pan-Islamist 
or one of those who fantasize in vain about the union of the feeble Islamic nations. This is not the case I 
swear to Allah. This is just a fate determined by God that shall come true. Europeans can use no tricks to 
prevent this from happening since eventually one will meet the consequences of one’s deeds. [This shall 
be the case] unless the nations who consider themselves as “civilized”… suddenly change course, refrain 
from their [colonial] ambitions of occupying the lands of the weak nations, reclaim their humanity and 
appreciate the true meaning of rights.
Talebov bases his critique mostly on moral grounds but remains faithful to the idea of the lack of 
sovereignty in the lawless nations:105
They should hold a big conference and build a new system for the totality of the Nations in the world … 
to force lawless nations to adopt constitutions and collectively base their relationship with the Muslim 
and Asian countries on integrity, honesty, friendship and consent.
Talebov goes on to detail a few suggestions about the formation of a big world federation under 
the rubric of a “red republic”106 – a socialist rhetoric of the time. In another instance, he reiterates 
the idea of establishing an “international community”,107 which, despite the fact it “seemed pre-
posterous to his readers”, he believes will someday come true.108
iv. concluding rEMarks
By the end of the nineteenth century, when the identity of “intellectuals” had gone global, the 
dominant ideology had shifted to a “positivist liberalism”.109 This paper provides evidence as to 
how Iranian intellectuals were heavily influenced by the wave of legal positivist ideas that were 
globalised in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.110 As the paper demonstrates, legal 
positivism was dominant in the consciousness of Malkum Khan and Talebov, who were among 
the founding fathers of modern legal thought in nineteenth century Iran. Although each had dis-
tinct influences and personal motives, both Malkum, an influential politician and an activist, and 
Talebov, a middle-class businessman and an independent mind, adhered to state-centred notions 
of law and governance as well as concepts of civilisation and organisation as a basis for maintain-
ing sovereignty in international law. 
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